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This working paper is an in-depth analysis of Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. The analysis examines 
the economic factors that impact Chipotle’s underlying business fundamentals. This analysis is 
then combined with a proprietary Discounted Cash Flow (P-DCF) model to determine Chipotle’s 
financial position. The model will be presented along-side Monte-Carlo simulations to reveal the 
distribution of probable free cash flows and the potential for future earnings. In addition to these 
quantitative factors, we I assess the alignment of Chipotle’s executives with shareholders based 
on the company’s proxy report. At the conclusion of this analysis, I aim to clearly convey 
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($ in MMs except per share data)
Company Name Chipotle Mexican Grill
Date 12/19/16
Fiscal year ends (current period) 12/31/2016 (3Q)
Current Price 392.07$                                  
52 week high (date) 544.88$                                  
52 week low (date) 352.96$                                  
Market Cap 11,350.10$                              
Enterprise Value 10,990.95$                              
Total Debt -$                                      
Cash 359.15$                                  




2018 P/E (EPS) 30.87 (12.69)
2017 P/E (EPS) 42.90 (9.13)
2016 P/E (EPS) 256.93 (1.53)
2015 EPS 14.75$                                   
2014 EPS 14.08$                                   
2013 EPS 10.44$                                   
*Consensus Estimates as of 12/19/16   
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Executive Summary 
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (NYSE:CMG) operates fast-casual Mexican food 
restaurants. By analyzing historical averages, forward guidance from management, and the 
macro environment, our Proprietary Discounted Cash Flow (P-DCF) model estimates that 
Chipotle’s probable free cash flow per share is $264.80; i.e. a significant discount compared to 
the current market price of $392.07. This result was obtained using bullish near-term revenue 
growth estimates in the face of Chipotle’s public relations fiasco pertaining to food safety. Given 
my sell recommendation, applying optimistic assumptions in the P-DCF will result in a more 
conservative model output. I took a relatively bullish stance with regard to future revenue growth 
rates to illustrate the degree to which the market the company must grow in order to justify 
today’s valuation.  
Reiterating this theme of bullishness, I hold the absolute margins on the majority of 
Chipotle’s expense line items constant over the ten-year model forecast period. I use this 
approach despite minimal signs of historical operating leverage and the high likelihood of lofty 
requirements for marketing expenses and other promotional activities to improve public 
relations. In particular, food, beverage and packaging expenses are given a negative 10 basis 
point annual step even though Chipotle is rolling out new menu items that could potentially 
increase the firm’s food costs. In light of a very expensive valuation, weak management with 
decent compensation policies, secular trends affecting the company’s popularity, and recent 
incidents tarnishing the Chiptole brand, I assign a sell rating. 
Company Background and Recent Developments 
Chipotle is a fast-casual Mexican food restaurant operator, with a focus on burritos, tacos, 
burrito bowls, and salads. The company was founded in 1993 and is based in Denver, Colorado. 
As of September 30, 2016 the company operated 2,129 Chipotle restaurants in the United States, 
none of which the company franchises. The company also oversees 15 restaurants in Canada, six 
in England, five in France, and one in Germany. Furthermore, Chipotle operated 15 ShopHouse 
Southeast Asia Kitchen (“ShopHouse”) restaurants, which serve fast-casual Asian cuisine (the 
company has since shut down this business after the concept did not catch on). Chipotle has also 
invested in a consolidated entity that owns and operates seven Pizzeria Locale locations, a fast 
casual pizza restaurant. Chipotle manages its operations based on nine regions and aggregates 
them to one reportable segment1. 
Chipotle’s popularity exploded between the start of 2012 through 2015 as health and 
wallet-conscious consumers nationwide embraced the company’s commitment to “food with 
integrity.” Chipotle’s mission has been to use high quality ingredients grown with respect for the 
environment, animals, and the people who grow or raise this food. Initially, this business method 
effectively distinguished them from competitors that have applied a more formulaic and less 
nutritious approach to fast food (read: McDonald’s)2.  
However, significant food safety incidents in 2015 impacted hundreds of customers 
around the country and had direct effects on Chipotle’s performance and brand. From July to 
December, various outbreaks of E. coli, norovirus, and Salmonella occurred in Washington, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1058090/000105809016000058/cmg-20151231x10k.htm#Item_1	  
2 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1058090/000105809016000058/cmg-20151231x10k.htm 
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Oregon, California, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Massachusetts3. In response, Chipotle 
closed all of its restaurants on February 8, 2016 for an all-staff meeting on food safety. Company 
founder and co-CEO Steve Ells affirmed the company’s commitment to food safety. The 
consumer and market reactions to the various incidents, however, were not mild. Shares of 
Chipotle stock, which peaked in August 2015 at $758, now hover around $400. Comparable 
restaurant sales declined 24.9% in the nine months ended September 30, 20164. This dramatic 
decline reflects increasingly negative perceptions of the Chipotle brand and the safety and 
quality of its food.  
In an effort to increase sales and customer loyalty, management spearheaded several 
promotional activities, such as Chiptopia Summer Rewards, which offered rewards that 
incentivized customers to visit restaurants more frequently5. Third quarter results for FY 2016 
illustrate that despite Chiptopia, the company could not lure back customers6. Chipotle has 
engaged in three consecutive quarters of discounting and is now becoming more aggressive with 
advertising, digital ordering, and new additions to its long-outdated menu. It is currently testing 
TV ads, a method of marketing the company had previously avoided7. Additionally, management 
recently introduced chorizo to the restaurant’s menu, an item that now accounts for roughly 7% 
of entire sales. The team plans to continue adding items. Lastly, Chipotle is fleshing out a 
mobile-friendly website that customers can use, as well as in-store tablet ordering. It remains to 
be seen whether these initiatives will have a material impact on top-line and bottom-line 
performance. 
In addition to revamping the stores, per se, to increase profit, activist hedge fund investor 
William Ackman of Pershing Square Capital Management disclosed a 9.9% stake in Chipotle 
stock in September. Ackman is known for taking positions in underperforming companies and 
advocating for change, often lobbying for a seat on the board of directors. Indeed, the Wall Street 
Journal reported earlier in November that Ackman and Chipotle were nearing a settlement that 
could give Ackman’s firm a voice in the boardroom, although there were not any specific details 
about how many seats he might win8.  
Shareholders who are long CMG stock may interpret Ackman’s stake in either a positive 
or negative light. However, I choose the latter for three reasons. First, Ackman has already begun 
to put pressure on the company to broaden its share repurchase program and to take on debt for 
the first time, a questionable decision.9. Chipotle’s management has already misallocated capital 
in spending free cash flow on buying back its overpriced stock. There is little merit to borrowing 
to fund the repurchase of overvalued Chipotle shares. The company cannot afford interest 
expense at this juncture and risks destroying long-term shareholder value if our valuation is 
indeed correct.  
Next, Chipotle has long been criticized for its clubby board. The company operates a co-
CEO structure and also combines the roles of chairman and CEO. Essentially, all nine board 
members have ties (either through previous business ventures or personal matters) to co-CEO 
and chairman Steve Ells. New board members with experience in marketing, crisis 
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communication, and technology will likely be key for the company to meet its troubles, and it is 
easy to see Ackman rallying for such changes. However, at the same time, many investors on the 
Street say a shakeup to the entrenched board has been a long time coming and probably does not 
require Ackman. Furthermore, dismantling the co-CEO structure should also help (read: Whole 
Foods).  
Third, I fundamentally disagree with Ackman’s perspective on the company’s strategic 
positioning and performance drivers. The following excerpts are taken from Pershing Square’s 
3Q letter to investors10.   
 
We have always believed that a good time to buy a great business is when it is in temporary 
trouble. While Chipotle’s reputation has been bruised, we think that with the passage of time and 
improved marketing, technology and governance initiatives, the business will not only recover but 
become much stronger. Chipotle’s sales recovery will be neither smooth nor predictable over the next few 
quarters; yet, we believe that all of the key drivers of Chipotle’s powerful economic moat and long-term 
success remain intact. These drivers include: 
1. A strong and relevant brand built by visionary leadership 
2. A differentiated product offering with a highly attractive value proposition 
3. Substantial scale in the fast casual industry and first-mover advantage in real estate 
4. Strong unit economics and extremely high returns on capital, driven by a well-honed model that 
facilitates best-in-class throughput 
5. Enormous growth opportunities including new units and operating enhancements such as mobile 
ordering and catering 
 
… Today, we believe that Chipotle is one of the most compelling and authentic large-scale food brands in 
the U.S. 
 
 The number one driver that Ackman cites pertains to Chipotle’s, “strong and relevant 
brand.” In reality though, Chipotle’s brand is neither strong . The company’s brand reputation 
has become extremely blemished, probably beyond repair. As Bloomberg News asserts, the 
primary affliction for Chipotle is that the freshness of its food, which was centric to the success 
of the brand, has become the company’s biggest weakness. Locally sourced food, free of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), hormones, and antibiotics becomes much less 
appealing if it causes sickness. Brand consultant, Allen Adamson, said that the food catastrophe 
“strikes deeper at their brand because so much of their story is based on the quality of their 
ingredients. This can clearly do long-term damage.11” A brief review of the company’s 
operations through fiscal 2016 reveals this taking shape, and analysts at Raymond James suggest 
that the sharp decline in sales “could prove to be more permanent in nature.12”. Not only have 
customers lost trust in the quality and safety of Chipotle’s food, but they have also grown tired of 
the chain’s stagnant and limited menu. Consumer preferences are a very important determinant 
of performance in the restaurant space. Ackman might see “a differentiated product offering with 
a highly attractive value proposition.” I see the opposite. Indeed, Deutsche Bank analysts cite a 
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lack of innovation, overall complacency, and the resulting “menu fatigue” as a contributing to 
factor to lost sales13. 
Catalysts and Risks 
• TV advertising proves an effective method of advertising, reflected through increased 
same-store sales trends. 
• Menu expansion, such as the two dessert items currently in testing, garners revitalized 
consumer interest in Chipotle stores. 
• Improvements in digital selling facilitate a more convenient customer experience and 
therefore increase restaurant traffic and sales. 
• The presence of activist investor Bill Ackman whips corporate governance into shape. 
• Ackman’s involvement could, however, disrupt the company’s restoration efforts and 
cause more distress (read: Valeant, Target). 
• In absence of amendments under Ackman, the clubby board and management resist 
change.     
• Another food safety incident occurs, further damaging Chipotle’s brand reputation. 
• Softer-than-expected comparable restaurant sales for 4Q16, which management expects 
to be in the negative single digits. 
• Higher-than-expected food cost safety protocols and procedures resulting in margin 
compression. 
• The overall restaurant space continues to struggle given weak traffic due to food deflation 
(cheaper groceries) and rising rent, and drags Chipotle sales down with it. 
• A weakening consumer would hurt the company even if Chipotle can replenish its brand.  
Historical Performance 
Chipotle shareholders have experienced somewhat muted returns over the past five years, 
with a cumulative average growth rate (CAGR) of 3.34% and a cumulative total return of 
23.25%14. Most equity market participants would view these returns as disappointing. Figure 1 
demonstrates Chipotle’s historical stock price versus the S&P 500 Index.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 http://www.fool.com/investing/2016/05/30/is-menu-fatigue-chipotles-newest-problem.aspx 
14 Bloomberg Terminal, Function <HP> 
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Figure 1: Chipotle versus S&P 500 Five Year Historical Performance
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command <GP>. Accessed 12/18/2016  
 
Of the 37 analysts covering the stock, 11 assign a buy rating, 18 have a hold rating, and 8 
assign a sell rating. The average target price is $410.50, implying a 3.6% upside to the current 
price15.  
A Long Term Asset Turnover (LTAT; i.e. revenue divided by average long-term assets 
per fiscal year) analysis of a company’s historical financial results can yield fruitful insights. The 
chart in Figure 2 below plots Chipotle’s LTAT and Useful Life (UL; i.e. long-term assets divided 
by depreciation and amortization expense) over a ten-year period (2005-2015). LTAT increased 
to 2.73 in FY 2014 as the company grew its top line healthily. In fourth quarter 2015 the decline 
in revenue that came along with the food-borne illness outbreaks was enough to slow overall 
revenue growth and, by extension, reduce LTAT.  
Through 2010, UL fell steadily as the increase in depreciation and amortization outpaced 
that of long-term assets. In 2011, however, Chipotle began engaging in long-term investments. 
This boosted overall-long term assets and reversed the trend. UL increased each year until FY 
2015, when Chipotle opened fewer new locations than in previous years, which caused long-term 
assets to decelerate. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Bloomberg Terminal, Function <ANR> 
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Figure 2: Chipotle 10 Year Historical LTAT versus UL





































The P-DCF model for Chipotle was built as discussed in course lectures. In a typical 
“buy” stock pitch, conservative assumptions might mean projecting revenue at a growth rate 
below its historical mean and contracting margins over the forecast period. Thus, in the case of a 
short sale pitch, conservative model inputs are those that will put upward pressure on the 
obtained model output.  
 
Balance Sheet and Income Statement Trends 
 
The results are contained in the ‘Balance Sheet’ and ‘Income Statement’ worksheets of the accompanying 
Excel workbook. 
 
On the balance sheet, the first notable line item fluctuation occurs with cash and cash 
equivalents. I observe that the cash balance generally declines in periods that treasury stock 
increases. Put simply, the company is buying back shares (it spent over $1B on repurchases from 
mid 2015 to mid 201616). A brief glance of the balance sheet also reveals a debt-free capital 
structure. Upon inspection of the assets, it is clear that Chipotle exited a significant number of 
positions in investments and short-term investments between the end of FY15 and the third 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-11/chipotle-spends-1-billion-on-stock-buybacks-as-recovery-
lags 
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quarter of 2016. Liquidation of these stakes was likely part of an effort to free up cash given the 
financial pressure resulting from the food-borne illness incidents.  
Chipotle’s income statement highlights the deceleration and the decline in revenue that 
began in FY15 and persisted into the current fiscal year. The prorated estimate for FY16 of 
$3.83B represents a 15% contraction in revenue. Margins on expenses are relatively constant 




The results are contained in the ‘Value Drivers’ worksheet of the accompanying Excel workbook. 
 
The value drivers worksheet provides substantial insight into the past five years of 
Chipotle’s operational health. First and foremost, fiscal years 2011 through 2014 clearly display 
the telltale signs of an explosive growth period. The top line grows at impressive rates, averaging 
21.9% over the period. Moving to FY15, this figure drops slightly to 9.6%, reflecting the weak 
fourth quarter performance that followed the food-borne illness crises. The increase in revenue 
was almost exclusively driven by new store openings. Specifically, of the $392.9 million 
increase in revenue, revenue from restaurants not yet in the comparable base contributed $390.4 
million, or 99.36%, of the increase in sales in FY15. Of this $390.4 million, $183.6 million was 
attributable to restaurants opened during FY15.  Comparable restaurant sales increased 0.2% on 
the year and declined 14.6% for the fourth quarter of 2015, including a 30% decline in December 
201517. 
 When considering fixed costs (the sum of labor, occupancy, other operating costs, and 
general and administrative expenses), the trend as a percentage of revenue from FY11through 
FY14 was downwards. The reason behind this is that Chipotle reported positive comparable 
restaurant sales growth over this period, allowing the company to earn more revenue on the same 
fixed costs. However, I see fixed costs as a percentage of revenue increase in FY15 due to the 
food illness incidents. I can expect a significant increase in FY16 given the crises’ dampening 
effects on revenue, as well as the significant uptick in advertising and marketing efforts 





The results are contained in the ‘P-DCF’ worksheet of the accompanying Excel workbook. 
   
Revenue was projected based on the single reportable business segment. It was predicted 
to contract 15% in FY16 to $3.826B, which is the approximate value obtained when prorating 
the first three quarters of FY16evenue. It’s worth noting that this decline is slightly more 
pessimistic when compared to street estimates. For example, JP Morgan models a 12.5% decline 
in FY16 revenue. However, JP Morgan made this assumption before December 6, 2016. On this 
date, Chipotle co-CEO Steve Ells expressed his concern about the company’s ability to meet its 
guidance for the year18 at a Barclays retail conference in New York. I feel that this comment 
supports our decision to contract FY16 revenue slightly more than Street analysts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1058090/000105809016000058/cmg-20151231x10k.htm 
18 http://www.businessinsider.com/chipotle-says-its-nervous-about-guidance-for-the-year-2016-12 
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For FY17, revenue is projected at a growth rate of 20%, factoring in any recovery in sales 
to pre-crisis levels that might occur. For the remainder of the forecast period – FY18 to FY25 – 
our model assumes a 12% revenue growth rate for each year. These assumptions may seem 
overly optimistic compared to street estimates of roughly 18% revenue growth for FY17 and 
then 10% thereafter (FY18 to FY25). However, as mentioned above, these generous revenue 
projections are chosen intentionally to help convey the degree to which Chipotle stock is 
overvalued. At these rates, our output implies that the current market price trades at premium of 
roughly 30%. Put another way, holding all else equal, total revenue would have to grow at a 
CAGR of 19% from FY18 to FY25 in order to justify the current stock price of $382.48. This 
scenario is highly unlikely considering the pervasive trends damaging Chipotle’s brand and 
dragging down its top line. 
With the exception of two line items, cost margins are held constant at their historical 
averages. The first divergence is with the food, beverage and packaging expenses line item. It is 
fairly clear, based on its sequential historical margins on revenue [32.5%, 32.6%, 33.4%, 34.6%, 
33.4%] that this item has not illustrated signs of operating leverage. Since Chipotle is likely 
transitioning into more the mature stage of its life cycle, however, I assume that it will achieve 
operating leverage through economies of scale in future periods. Thus, I apply a 0.1% step 
decline, as is common practice, over the ten year forecast period. The potential for expansion to 
temporarily increase food expenses might bring into question this assumption, but I choose to 
omit this consideration for the sake of yielding a conservative model output. J apply this same 
step decline to general and administrative expenses for the similar reason of obtaining a 
conservative result and due to the fact that this line item has generally declined over the 
historical period of focus.  
With regard to the cash flow drivers, capital expenditures and depreciation and 
amortization are each equated to three percent of revenue, the idea being that the firm invests an 
amount that is roughly equivalent to that which it expends. During Chipotle’s growth phase, it 
made sense that capital expenditures outpaced depreciation and amortization. However, moving 
forward these items should converge to a one-to-one ratio as the company matures. Changes in 
working capital, along with another immaterial item, are zeroed out in the model due to lack of 
predictability. Remaining items such as interest and taxes were held at their historical averages. 
Model Results 
These assumptions lead to free cash flow per share of $264.80 versus the current price of 
$392.07, implying 33% potential downside. According to the Monte-Carlo results shown in 
Figure 3 below, the current price falls in the 99th percentile of the simulation. This essentially 
indicates that there is a 1% probability that Chipotle’s long-term free cash flow per share will 
exceed today’s market price (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Monte Carlo Simulation Output  
Qualitative and Other Analyses 
 
 Competitor Analysis 
 
 To gain an understanding of Chipotle’s competitive positioning among industry peers, I 
conduct a competitor analysis. This analysis includes three components: valuation multiples, 
operating metrics, and profitability metrics. These methodologies can pose useful implications 
when viewed in tandem. Namely, they can point to any instances of variability in the multiples. 
If Chipotle has the best growth and strongest margins, for example, then high valuation multiples 
could be justified. 
 The valuation multiple columns in the Figure 4 exhibit a comparison of Chipotle’s price 
to earnings (P/E) and enterprise value (EV) to earnings before interest, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA). The P/E ratio essentially reflects the dollar amount a market participant 
will invest in a company to receive one dollar of that company’s earnings. Chipotle’s trailing 
twelve-month P/E ratio is 125.31x, while the peer universe average and median P/E is 31.59x 
and 29.27x respectively. The EV/EBITDA ratio is another valuation multiple that takes into 
account a firm’s debt, which the P/E ratio does not. By this measure as well, Chipotle’s multiples 
sizably exceed the industry mean and median. 
 
Investment Thesis for Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. (NYSE:CMG) by Alexander Mabie	  
	  
Name Mkt Cap P/E  EV EV/EBITDA EV/Sales Sales Growth Yoy (%) Y- SSS (%) EBITDA Margin
POTBELLY CORP 360.21 36.39 7.96 8.46 0.77 14.03 4.40 9.80
PANERA BREAD COMPANY 4882.62 31.43 12.01 12.77 1.77 6.03 1.90 14.84
SHAKE SHACK INC 1388.72 83.24 25.44 33.92 5.14 60.80 13.30 16.41
DOMINO'S PIZZA INC 7781.56 39.55 18.74 20.91 3.85 11.17 N/A 19.94
PAPA JOHN'S INTL INC 3241.11 35.29 17.13 18.38 1.97 2.45 N/A 11.44
STARBUCKS CORP 85490.20 30.44 15.08 16.51 3.77 11.24 5.00 24.67
JACK IN THE BOX INC 3602.41 28.25 12.37 13.68 2.56 3.83 N/A 20.94
WENDY'S CO/THE 3544.42 24.06 14.65 13.99 3.15 -6.42 3.10 25.87
POPEYES 1272.18 29.60 15.22 16.40 4.73 9.93 5.90 32.48
YUM! BRANDS INC 23431.47 17.61 14.42 9.95 3.15 -1.31 N/A 23.22
MCDONALD'S CORP 101853.91 21.66 13.09 13.06 4.79 -7.39 1.50 38.56
SONIC CORP 1265.06 20.75 11.45 10.59 3.08 0.04 2.60 27.90
DUNKIN' BRANDS GROUP INC 4890.37 29.85 14.84 15.96 8.28 8.31 N/A 54.14
DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC 9400.91 20.59 9.77 10.14 1.13 2.51 3.30 13.78
TEXAS ROADHOUSE INC 3442.86 27.88 11.67 12.89 1.46 14.24 7.20 13.54
BUFFALO WILD WINGS INC 3037.93 28.93 9.62 10.20 1.48 19.56 4.20 15.44
Average 16180.37 31.59 13.97 14.86 3.19 9.31 4.76 22.69
Median 3573.42 29.27 13.76 13.37 3.11 7.17 4.20 20.44
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL 
INC 10873.59 125.31 20.48 37.88 3.08 9.56 0.20 7.18
Figure 4: Chipotle Competitor Analysis
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command <RV>. Accessed 12/15/16
Valuation Multiples and Operating Metrics
 
  
 Therefore, we might expect to see that Chipotle has superior operating and profitability 
metrics, but this is not the case. Chipotle’s FY15 revenue growth slightly edges over the industry 
average and median. Further apparent weakness lies in same-store sales growth and the EBITDA 
margin.  
 In summary, it seems that there is a significant discrepancy between Chipotle’s 
staggeringly high valuation and its underwhelming operating and profit performance. While this 
analysis is not a surefire method to craft an investment thesis, it is a useful ancillary stress test. 
Investors ought to be wary of overpaying for a company that cannot outperform its competitors 
throughout the income statement. Chipotle fits this description to a tee. 
 
What Say the Bulls? 
 
 I briefly addressed bullish sentiments on Chipotle earlier in this paper when discussing 
Ackman’s thesis. However, to properly identify a short candidate, it is prudent to extensively 
evaluate the arguments of those most positive on the stock. Ackman, of course, is not the only 
investor who sees a bright future for the beleaguered restaurant chain. The famous Jim Cramer of 
CNBC cites the experience of Jack-in-the-Box after its 1993 food borne illness incident as 
evidence that Chipotle’s “ballgame will change19.” However, there are several reasons why I 
disagree with this comparison. 
1. The Jack-in-the-Box food borne illness outbreak only had one occurrence, while 
Chipotle had five consecutive major incidents in less than six months. 
2. The Jack-in-the-Box food borne illness outbreak was traced to a single batch of 
tainted meat that was cooked to the federal-standard temperature. The sources of 
the Chipotle pathogens have yet to be determined. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 http://realmoney.thestreet.com/articles/12/06/2016/cramer-wait-few-months-longer-buy-chipotle 
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3. Jack-in-the-Box management was extremely upfront about their outbreak, 
apologizing immediately. Chipotle’s team waited months and arrogantly 
dismissed public concern over the outbreaks as “hype” concocted by the media 
and by the Center of Disease Control20. 
4. Jack-in-the-Box had a very simple supply chain, but Chipotle’s produce items and 
other ingredients are at much higher risk food borne illness. 
5. Lastly, Jack’s outbreak occurred in an era when news was still being delivered to 
Americans mainly through TV and newspapers. Chipotle’s incidents have been 
viral across dozens of news outlets and all over social media. 
 
 Management Compensation 
 
 According to Chipotle’s FY15 proxy statement, the company’s executives are 
compensated in three ways: base salaries, annual bonuses, and equity-based compensation21. 
Base salaries are determined each year depending on each executive’s contributions, individual 
performance, and level of experience. Annual bonuses are determined under the company-wide 
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP). This plan gives variable payouts based on operating and financial 
performance goals approved by the compensation committee each year, as well as subjective 
measures of individual performance. Equity compensation is designed to align the incentives of 
executive officers with shareholder interests and to reward the creation of shareholder value. The 
following charts, taken from the company's proxy report, illustrate the breakdown of 















To determine various aspects of its compensation policies, Chipotle uses the following 
restaurant industry peer group:  
 
COMPANY    2015 ANNUAL REVENUES(1)(2)     MARKET CAPITALIZATION(1)(3)  
Biglari Holdings, Inc.    $ 861      $ 673   
BJ’s Restaurants, Inc.    $ 920      $ 1,096   
Bloomin’ Brands, Inc.    $ 4,378      $ 2,024   
Bob Evans Farms, Inc.    $ 1,336      $ 811   
Brinker International, Inc.    $ 3,100      $ 2,856   
Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc.    $ 1,813      $ 3,040   
Carrols Restaurant Group, Inc.    $ 823      $ 411   
The Cheesecake Factory Incorporated    $ 2,101      $ 2,181   
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.    $ 2,861      $ 3,036   
Darden Restaurants, Inc.    $ 6,905      $ 8,155   
DineEquity Inc.    $ 681      $ 1,578   
Domino’s Pizza Inc.    $ 811      $ 3,945   
Dunkin Brands Group, Inc.    $ 2,118      $ 6,079   
Fiesta Restaurant Group, Inc.    $ 664      $ 893   
Ignite Restaurant Group, Inc.    $ 830      $ 110   
Jack In The Box Inc.    $ 1,540      $ 2,746   
McDonald’s Corp.    $ 25,413      $ 108,480   
Panera Bread Company    $ 2,682      $ 5,206   
Papa John’s International Inc.    $ 1,637      $ 2,180   
Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc.    $ 1,258      $ 860   
Ruby Tuesday, Inc.    $ 1,123      $ 341   
Sonic Corp.    $ 612      $ 1,594   
Starbucks Corporation    $ 19,733      $ 89,132   
Texas Roadhouse Inc.    $ 1,807      $ 2,509   
The Wendy’s Company    $ 1,956      $ 2,945   
Yum! Brands, Inc.    $ 13,105      $ 31,502   
 
Chipotle’s compensation committee administers base salaries in the range around the 50th 
percentile of the market (determined by the above peer group). The committee also takes into 
account other factors such as individual performance, experience, development, and potential. 
Therefore, the overall may range from the 25th percentile and below for newer executives to the 
90th percentile or higher for “truly exceptional performers in critical roles who consistently 
exceed expectations.” The current base salaries of Chipotle’s executives are at the high end of 
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the range. While no discretionary bonuses were paid in 2015, base salaries were increased for all 
executives. 
 
In general, four measures are used to determine the company and team performance 
factors. The fiscal 2015 targets for each of the metrics are shown in the table below.  
 
Performance Measure    Target  
Operating Income (before AIP and stock compensation expense)    $  1,067.9 million   
New Rest. Avg. Daily Sales      $5,278   
Comparable Rest. Sales Increase      7.0 %  
New Weeks of Operations      5,188   
 
Of the above measures, operating income is weighted most heavily, as the company 
believes profitability is the most important measure of its financial success and driver of 
shareholder value. Due to the food-borne illness incidents that negatively affected 2015 results, 
Chipotle’s company performance factor was 0 percent, resulting in no AIP payouts to executives.  
 
For FY15, the compensation committee made long-term incentive awards to each 
executive officer in the form of new performance share awards. These awards incorporate a 
three-year performance-contingent vesting period based on Chipotle’s relative performance 
return versus the restaurant industry peer group. The following three measures are weighted 
equally: averaged revenue growth, net income growth, and total shareholders’ return. The 
following illustrates the specifics of payouts and contingencies.  
 
























VALUE   
Steve Ells     0       7,444       14,887       29,774       49.2 %  
Monty Moran     0       7,444       14,887       29,774       49.2 %  
Jack Hartung     0       3,126       6,252       12,504       37.8 %  
Mark Crumpacker     0       2,233       4,466       8,932       11.2 %  
 
Finally, the summary compensation below effectively communicates the composition of 
Chipotle’s executive compensation.  
 
NAME AND 
PRINCIPAL POSITION   YEAR  SALARY     
STOCK 
AWARDS (1)    
OPTION 
AWARDS (2)    
NON-EQUITY  
INCENTIVE PLAN 
COMPENSATION(3)    
ALL OTHER  
COMPENSATION(4)    TOTAL   
STEVE ELLS   2015   $ 1,526,000    $ 12,030,036     —     —    $ 281,858    $ 13,837,894   
Chairman and Co-Chief Executive 
Officer 
  2014   $ 1,400,000     —    $ 23,698,500    $ 3,570,000    $ 255,770    $ 28,924,270   
  2013   $ 1,400,000    $ 7,961,250    $ 12,304,500    $ 3,196,816    $ 254,305    $ 25,116,871   
MONTY MORAN   2015   $ 1,308,000    $ 12,030,036     —     —    $ 223,041    $ 13,561,077   
Co-Chief Executive Officer   2014   $ 1,200,000     —    $ 23,698,500    $ 3,060,000    $ 194,702    $ 28,153,203   
  2013   $ 1,200,000    $ 7,961,250    $ 12,304,500    $ 2,740,128    $ 191,176    $ 24,397,054   
JACK HARTUNG   2015   $ 745,769    $ 5,052,179     —     —    $ 235,361    $ 6,033,309   
Chief Financial Officer   2014   $ 700,000     —    $ 8,125,200    $ 1,213,800    $ 206,842    $ 10,245,842   
  2013   $ 645,719    $ 3,980,625    $ 4,101,500    $ 975,501    $ 179,004    $ 9,882,349   
MARK CRUMPACKER   2015   $ 532,077    $ 3,608,930     —     —    $ 141,581    $ 4,282,588   
Chief Creative and Development Officer   2014   $ 500,000     —    $ 4,062,600    $ 663,000    $ 109,591    $ 5,335,191   
  2013   $ 402,580    $ 3,184,500    $ 1,692,400    $ 506,328    $ 107,054    $ 5,892,862   
 
Overall, the company’s management compensation plan is mediocre. The first red flag is 
the fact that base salaries were increased in 2015. Even though no annual bonuses were paid out 
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last year (and rightfully so), the compensation committee’s decision to increase base salaries 
after the food-borne illness incidents is questionable. One are of strength is the compensation 
structure.. Roughly 90% of each executive’s overall pay is at risk, and within this at-risk section, 
there is a favorable split between annual bonuses and long-term incentives. Regarding the long-
term incentives, however, there are a couple minor blips. First, a three-year period is really not 
“long-term.” Something in the range of five years would be more optimal for aligning interests 
with shareholders who have a truly long time horizon. Second, one of the measures involved in 
calculating new performance shares granted is annual revenue growth (over the same three year 
period). An analysis that also includes a comparison of revenue growth for each of the three 
years over this period would be valuable as well. Without such a provision, there is more 
likelihood that egregious years such as FY16 fall between the cracks and do not truly implicate 
management, as they should.  
 
Share Ownership and Insider Trading 
 
Figure 5 shows a list of Chipotle’s largest shareholders. After Pershing Square Capital 
Management, Bill Ackman’s hedge fund, several other big institutional players have invested 
considerable stakes in Chipotle’s equity. These firms include exchange-traded fund managers 
like BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, as well as the more traditional mutual fund managers 
such as Fidelity and Goldman Sachs Asset Management. The screenshot also reveals that 
Chipotle’s short interest is 17.3% of the float, a fairly high value. 
 
Figure 5: All Holders of Chipotle Stock, Sorted by Size
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command <HDS>. Accessed 12/19/2016  




Figure 6 tracks management’s open market buys and sells of the stock over the past 
calendar year. It highlights one sale transaction executed by co-CEO Steve Ells on May 31, 
2016. Actual insider positions can be seen in Figure 7, which sorts them by size. In aggregate, 
insiders hold 1.65% of outstanding stock. Steve Ells owns .68% of the company’s outstanding 
shares. Clearly, insiders do not own a significant portion of Chipotle’s equity. While not 
necessarily a warning sign itself, low insider ownership should prompt investors to take another 
look at company executives. It is important to understand the degree to which these individuals 
are financially incentivized to cultivate positive company performance. 
 
Figure 6: Chipotle Insider Transactions
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command <GPTR>. Accessed 12/19/2016  
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Figure 7: Insider Holdings of Chipotle Stock, Sorted by Size
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command <HDS>. Accessed 12/19/2016  
Conclusion 
 Based on the disappointing output of the P-DCF, a slew of food-borne illnesses that 
induced a reversal in popularity, the structure of Chipotle’s management compensation, and a 
rich relative valuation, it appears that there is significant potential downside given the current 
stock price of $392.07. While management has optimistic views on the company’s ability to right 
its course in the wake of its 2015 public relations nightmare, this remains to be seen. Regarding 
management, I believe that their allocation of capital with an emphasis on share repurchase 
programs is ill informed given Chipotle’s lofty valuation. Furthermore, I perceive the presence of 
activist investor William Ackman in the stock as an overall negative, as I do not share his views 
on the health of the company’s brand reputation and the brand reputation. Lastly, I think that a 
sustained difficult macro backdrop and the potential for consumer spending to weaken in the 
near-term pose significant risks. Again, all of these factors, when considered in conjunction, 
point to a sell. 
